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ABSTRACT
We rationalize fixed cate loan commitments (forward credit contracting wíth
options) in a competitive credit market with universal risk neutcality. Future
interest rates are random, but there are no transactions costs. Borrowers finance
projects with bank loans and choose ex post unobservable actions that affect
project payoffs. Credit contract desión by the bank is the outcome of a
(non-cooperative) Nash game between the bank and the borrower. The initial formal
analysis is basically in two steps. First, we show that the only spot credit
market Nash equilibria that exist are inefficient in the sense that they result irt
welfare losses for borrowers due to the bank's informational handicap. Second, we
show that loan commitments, because of their ability to weaken the link between the
offering bank's expected profit and the loan interest rate, enable the complete
elimination of informationally induced welfare losses and thus produce an outcome
that strictly Pareto dominates any spot market equilibrium. Perhaps our most
surprising resuli is that, if the borrower has some initial Liquidity, it is better
for the borrower to use it now to pay a commitment fee and buy a loan commitment
that entitles it to borrow in the future rather than save it for use as inside
equity in conjunction with spot borrowing.
COi4PETITION. RISK NEUTRALITY AND LOAN COt4~ITt~lENTS
1. INTRODUCTION
The purposs of this paper is to provide an economic rationale for bank loan
commitments in a competitive credit market -- where both spot and forward
contracting are poasible -- characterized by universal risk neutrality. Existing
explanations of loan eommits~ents assume either risk aversion oc transactions
costs.I For example, Thakor and Udell(1987) assume that borrowers are risk
averse,2 whereas Melnick and Plaut(1986) assume lenders are risk averse. And the
transactions costs acgument appears repeatedly in popular justifications of loan
commitments ( see Mason(1979), for example).
Neither risk aversion nor transactions costs, in our opinion, provide a
completely satisfactory anawer to the puzzle of why bank loan commitments are so
prevalent.3 Assuming risk aversiort is limiting for two reasons. First, it seems
to lead quite directly to loan conunitment demand purely on the well known grounds
of risk sharing. Second, it does not correspond well with reality where
hedgingldiversification opportunities for banks and borcowers could be better risk
dissipation mechanisms than loan eommitments. Transactions costs, on the other
hand, may well be the motivating factor for certain pre-arranged credit lines.
However, they fail to explain the existence of a wide variety of loan eommitment
contracts. For example, áf the prineipal goal is to minimize the borrower's
transactions costs. why should fixed rate loan commitment eontracts bs obsecvedP A
floating rate eommitment that provides the borrower a guarantsed soures of funds
would do just as well.,
We provide an information-based, eauilibrium rationale for loan commitment
demand in a universallv risk neutcal, competitive credit market devoid of frictions
such as tcansactions costs.s The model is as follows. At an initial point in
time, a risk neutral borrower can approach a risk neutral bank for a fixed rate
loan commitment that guarantees funds availability the next period. Alternatively,
it can wait until the next period and borrow in the spot market at the prevailing
spot rate. Interest rates are random. The borrower knows at the initial point in
time that it will need funds next period to invest in a one-period project that
will become available then. The project's payoff is random at the time of
investment, but the borrower can take some action prior to investing in the project
that can affect the payoff distribution. We view this as "developmental activity"
that precedes the actual project investment and the subsequent market introduction
of the product obtained as an output from the project. Examples are E á D,
pre-product introduction advertising, promotional campaigns, test marketing, etc.
The borrower's action choice is unobservable to the bank. Thus. the bank does not
lrnow the borrower's payoff distribution -- but the borrower does -- whsn it lendr
to it. Given competition, the bank's problem is to design credit contracts that
maximize the borrower's expected utility subject to the constraint that the bank at
least breaks even. We model this problem as a non-cooperative (Nash) game between
the competitive bank and the borrower.
With this setup we establísh. under plausible conditions, that if the borrower
is restricted to spot borrowing, there are two possibilities. Either a(~ash)
equilibrium does not exist or if it exists. it is inefficient. The inefficiency
manifests itself in the borrower choosing an action lesser than the first best.
The reason for this inefficiency is that interest rates have a distortionary effect
on the supply of productive inpvts,ó and the higher the interest rate the greater
is the distoction in the borrower's action away from first best. Because there are
states of nature in which the borrower's spot interest rate is relatively high, the
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borrower chooses a lower-than-first-best action in anticipation of these adverse
states. This creates a natucal economic incentive for a(fixed rate) loan
commitment. With sueh a contract the bank can set the borrowing rate low enough to
ensuce that the borcower ehooses a firat best action, thereby eliminating any
welfare distoriions linked to interest rates. Of course, this rate will usually De
so low that the Dank will suffer a loss on the loan itself. To recoup this loss,
the bank can charge a commitment fee upfront. The key is that this commitment fee
is paid initially and thus becomes a"sunk cost" for the borrower, with no impact
on the action choice. We show that such an arrangement strictly Pareto dominates
spot contracts. '
In this analysis we assume that the borrower borrows the same amount in the
spot market as it does under the loan commitment. However, the assumption that the
borrower has sufficient initial liquidity to pay the commitment fee implies that
this liquidity could be carried over for a period. It could then be used as an
equity input by the borrower to reduce its spot borcowing relative to its borcowiiig
under the commitment. It is well recognized that the moral hazard-related
distortions caused by debt can be reduced by increasing the borrower's equity
input. Surprisingly, we find that it is better for the borrower to use its initial
líauidity to par the commitment fee and vurchase a loan commitment rather than save
it for use as sauitr in conjunction with svot borrowinx.
The rest of this paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 containa a formal
description of the basic model and the (spot market) competitive equilibcium which
is obtained in the first best (full information) case. Seetion 3 has the spot
market competitive equilibcium when the bank is unable to observe the borrower's
action choice. Section 4 presents the analysis that estaDlishes the optimality oE
a fixed rate loan commitment in this setting. The implications of borrower equity
3
examined in this section. Section 5 concludes.
2. THE BASIC MODEL AND TNE FULL INFORMATION SOLUTION
We consider a perfectly competitive credit market in which banks compete for
both deposits and loans. In addition, universal risk neutrality is assumed. This
implies that (i) the bank depositors receive an expected return equal to the risk
free rate and, (ii) the bank earns zero expected profit. For simplicity, and
because it sacrifices no benerality here, we assume complete deposit insurance, so
that the riskless rate is the bank's deposit funding cost. Throughout the paper,
the supply of deposits is taken to be perfectly elastic at the spot riskless rate.
At an initial point in time (t 3 0), the borrower knows that it needs funds
next period (at t- 1) to invest in a one-period project that will become available
then. The project requires a one dollar investment which is assumed to be financed
by a bank loan. At the time of investment (t 3 1), the project's payoff is random
but the payofE distribution is known to the borrower. In particular, we assume
that the project's payoff, realized at t- 2, has a"two spike distribution." That
is, the return on the project in the "good" state is some positive number and in
the "bad" state it is zero. At t~0, that is prior to investinó in the project, the
borrower can undertake one of two actions, al or a2, with al i a2 i 0. The
action choice affects the payoff distribution in two ways. First, a higher action
increases the success probability, p(ai) c(0,1), of the project. Second, the
payoff of the project in the good state, E(ai), is positively affected by a
higher action. These effects imply p(al) ~ p(a2) and X(al) i E(a2) i 0.
Furthermore, the action al is "better" than the action a2 in the sense that the
expected utility of the borrower, if it self-finances, is gceater with al than
with a2. The action ai should be viewed as a developmental activity that
0
precedes the actual project investment, as discussed in the Introduction.
Undertaking the action is costly to the borrower. The costs are V(ai), with
V(al) ~ V(a2) i 0. We assume that doing nothing ia always feasible for the
borrowec. That is, even though we have defined the feasible action space for the
borrower as (al, a2} -- and will continue to use this feasible set in our
formal analysis -- we allow the borrower an action choice from (ai, a2. O).
If a- 0 is chosen, then p(a) - 0, E(a) a 0 and V(a) - 0. The reason for working
with the action space (al, a2} is that we will consistently assume that, if
an equilibrium exists, then the borrower's reservation utility of zero (which
results from choosing a- 0) is always exceeded by the equilibrium utility. Thus,
a- 0 will never be art optimal action choice and little is lost by notationally
dropping its availability.
We assume that at t-1, the riskless spot intecest rate can take a value Rq
with probability 8, and Rh with probability 1-9, with Rh i R~ i 1.
(Interest rates in this paper are really interest factors, i.e. one plus the
interest rate.) The realization oE the riskless spot interest rate has a direct
impact on the borrower's net payoff in that it affects the loan interest rate,
r(a,IR,), charged by the bank. The loan interest rate is written asi ~
r(ai~R~) to indicate that it depends on the realization of the riskless spot
interest rate, R~ t[R:, Rh}, and also on the bank's beliefs about the
borrower's action choice, ai c(al, a2}, (These beliefs trivially
coincide with the true action choice when ai is ex post observable to the bank).
It is assumed that the loan interest rate is the only credit instrument available
to the bank.~ Also, we assume taxes are zero. We discuss taxes in Section 4.
Noral hazard potentially exists since the action ai of the borrower is
unobservable to the bank, although in this section we shall assume that the bank
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can freely observe borrower action choices. Thus, the Dank genecally does not know
the borrower's payoff distribution when it lends to it. Note that this moral
hazard is different from the moral hazard in the standard principal-agent model in
the sense that the action choice of the borrower in our model precedes the contract
choice of the bank. In game-theoretic terminology,8 the informed agent
(borrower) moves first. Moreover, in the case of asymmetric information. we also
assume that, although the bank can observe whether or not a borrower's project was
successful, it cannot observe the actual project payoff. If the bank extends a
loan at a given interest rate, then all that it knows (or can agree with the
borrower upon) is that, given the borrower's optimal (unobservable) action choice
in response to the offered loan contract, the return in the successful state
exceeds the promised repayment. That is, the ex post information set of the
borrower is partitioned finer than that of the bank. Taken in conjunction with the
assumptions that the loan interest rate is the only spot contracting instrument
aveilable and that the borrower has limited liability protection, this assumption
implies that ex post payofE-contingent contracts of the Bhattacharya(1980) type are
pcecluded. Moreover. given the ex post payoff unobservability assumption, the
analyses of Diamond(1984), Gale-Hellwig(1985), and Townsend(1979) can be used to
show that the optimal contract between the bank and the borrower is a puce debt
9contract.
Ye will now establish that when the bank observes the action of the borrower
(symmetric information), the first best allocation is attainable. A first best
allocation is defined as a credit contract that gives the borrower exactly the same
expected utility it would enjoy if it self-financed the project and optimally
selected its action. Civen any action si t(aI, a2}, the borrower's
expected utility from self-financing is
6
P(ai)X(ai) - V(ai) - Rf,
where Rf is (one plus) the eurrent riakfree interest rate. Since we assume an
initial tl investment, Rf is the (compounded) future value of the initial
investment. Because the credit market is competitive, banks will compete with each
other to oEfer borrowers the most attractive contracts. Thus, in a competitive
equilibrium, borrower utilities will be maximized, subject to the constraint that
banks at least break even. This is in the spirit of Jaffee and Russell(1976) and
Besanko and Thakor(1987a, 1987b). In assumption (A1) below we formalize the
earlier statement that the action al is "better" than the action a2 in the
sense that the expected utilíty of the borrower, if it self-finances, is greater
with al than with a2.
p(al)E(al) - V(al) ~ p(a2)X(a2)-V(a2). (A1)
Given symmetric information, the bank can unambiguously determine the Loan interest
rate r(a,[R,), i e{1, 2}, j e(i,h), that guarantees zero expected
1 J
profit. The loan interest rate is such that the expected interest receipts equal
the cost of deposits which, in turn, is equal to the realized riskless rate. This gives
Rj
p(ai)r(ai~Rj) - Rj ~ r(ai1Rj) - . ir(1. Z). j~(i, h}. (1)
P(ai)
The borrower chooses its optimal action at t- 0 knowing that the bank can observe
its action choice, and offer a credit contract predicated upon that action choice.
Thus, the borrower determines its action as follows
a c argmax [6p(a)[~(a)-r(aIR~)] f(1-9]p(a)[X(a)-r(a~Rh)] - V(a)}. (2)
a c[al,a2)
Substituting (1) in (2) indicates that al will be optimally chosen if
p(al)x(al) - eR~ - [1-9]Rh - V(al) ~ p(a2)X(a2) - eR! - [1-6]Rh - V(a2).
Given assumption (A1). the above inequality always holds. This shows that
symmetric information permits attainment of the ficst best allocation.
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Before proceeding with the asymmetríc information case, we will state some
general assumptions wh~ch will ease our computational burden in the asymmetric
information case by facilitating focus on a limited set of reasonable spot market
equilibria. These assumptions ace
(i) E(a2) - r(ailRh) c 0. ai
e[al.a2):
(ii) E(a2) - r(ai~Rq) ~ 0, ai t[al,a2}; (A2)
(iii) E(al) - r(ai~Rj) ~ 0, ai t[al,a2j and Rjc[Rq,Rh).
(A2-(i)) implies that borrowers will never invest at t- 1 if they choose action
a2 at t a 0 and the high interest Rh is realized. This is assumed to hold even
if they get a contract based on the first best action aI. (A2-(ii)-(iii)) imply
that in all other cases, given an action choice at t~ 0, the borrowers will invest
at t. 1. We also make the following additional assumption.
(1-9)P(ai)[X(ai) - r(ai~Rh)1 - V(ai) c 0. ai ~[al,a2). (A3)
(A3) implies that it is never optimal for the borrower to undertake any positive
action at t- 0 if he knows that it is only possible for him to get the project
financed in the bad (R z Rh) state. we now turn to an examination of the
asymmetric information case.
3. THE SPOT MARKET CO~IPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM UNDER ASY14(ETRIC INFORMATION
In Section 2 we presented the full information equilibrium. We now return to
the general model formulation in which the bank cannot observe the borrowec's
action and is not able to write ex post payoff-contingent contracts. In this case,
the bank's informational handicap may be welfare-distorting. More spacifically. a
borrower, noting the unobservability of its action choice, might optimally decide
to choose the low action a2. In anticipation of this, the bank will adapt its
credit contract. Consequently. in the resulting (Nash) equilibrium, any welfare
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loss will be fuliy borne by the borrower. It is easy to see that lack of
observability of borrower action by the bank will be welfare-distorting if
Max [0, 6 max(0, p(a2)(X(a2)-r(aI~R!)]J}(I-BJmax{O,p(aZ)lX(a2)-r(a1~Rh)])-V(a2)}
(3)
Max [0, A max[0, p(ai)IX(al)-r(aI~R!)]}t[1-81max[O.P(aI)(X(aI)-r(al~~)]}-V(aI)}.
We assume (3) holds. Basically, (3) says that the full information credit eontract
is not incentive compatible when the bank cannot observe borrower actions ex post.
Anticipation of a first best contract always induces the borrower to choose a2, a
lower-than-first-best action. àote that this moral hazard problem exists despite
borrower (agent) rísk neutrality. The standard result of principal-agent models
that a first best can be obtained with agent risk neutrality (see, for example,
Harris and Raviv(1979)) implicitly assumes that limited Liability is not a concern
(either because the agent has no limited liability protection or becsuse debt is
riskless). We have both limited liabilitv and risky debt. Combining (3) with (A2)
yields the following assumption about parameter values which guarantees that (3)
will hold, given our earlier parametric assumptions.
6p(a2)IX(a2)-r(allxq)] - V(a2) i 6p(aI)[X(aI)-r(aI~R!)]
t[I-6)P(aI)[X(aI)-r(al~i~)) - V(nI). (A4)
(A4) implies that the bank cannot profitably offer the first best loan coniracts
r(aI(8~), 8~ c[8l,~). Therefore, we have to look for second best
equilibcia. Our first proposition is based on an examination of the entire range
of possibilities in order to find the set of feasible Nash equilibria in the spot
credit market.
PHOPOSITION 1: The only two possible gash equilibria in the spot credit market are
(i) the bank lends at r(aZ~Rq) if S: H1 and rations credit if S~ Bh,
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(ii) the bank lends at r(a21R~) if R z R: and at r(a2IRh) if R- Bh.
There are welfare losses ( relative to first best) in both equilibria.
PROOF: Ye will first prove that the allocations described above are indeed Nash
equilibria.
(i) Suppose the bank lends at r(a2IRq) if R: R~, and rations
completely íf R~ Rh. This is a Nash equilibrium if the borrowers (who correctly
anticipate the bank's policy in equilibrium) indeed choose action a2. This is
the case if the following condition holds.
6p(a2)[E(a2)-r(a2IR4)l - V(a2) ~ 6p(al)[X(al)-r(a2IRQ)) - V(al). (4)
A comparison of (A) with (A4) shows that (4) is a weaker condition than (A4),10
Hence, we have proved the existence of this Nash equilibrium.
(ii) Alternatively, the bank might offer r(a2IRL) and r(a2IRh) if
R is Ri and Rh, respectively. This is a Rash equilibrium (use (A2)) if,
OP(a2)IX(a2)-r(a2IR~)] - y(a2) i 6p(al)[X(al)-r(a2IR4))
f(1-81P(al)(X(al)-r(a2IRh)]-V(al) (5)
Again, comparing (5) with (A4) show that (5) is a weaker condition than (A4),11
So we have also proved the existence of this Nash equilibrium.
These two Rash equilibria are inefficient (second best). Both involve the
distortionary action choice a2. Kor4over. in the first equilibcium. rationing
also occurs. This is an even more serious welfare distortion. We now show that no
other Hash equilibrium exists. This part of the proof involvea an exhaustive
examination all possible candidates for Rash equilibrium.
(a) The bank offers r(allR~) if R z R: and r(allRh) if
R s Rh. This candidate equilibrium is directly ruled out by assumpiion
(A4).
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(b) The bank offers r(a21Rh) if R- Rh and rations if R- RQ.
This will never be a Nash equilibrium. To see this, look at assumption
(A2). One can see there that the action a2 together with the occurrence
of the R s Rh state implies that investing at t z 1 provides tha
borrower with negative utility. Thus, the proposed contract violates the
individual rationality constcaint.
(c) The bank offers r(a1~Rq) if R: RQ, and cations if R- Rh.
Using (AZ), we see that this ie not a Nash equilibrium if
eP(a2)[X(a2)-r(alIR4)] - V(a2) ~ eP(al)[X(al)-r(allR~)] - V(al).
We can compace the above inequality with (A~) to see that it always
holds. Hence, this is not a Nash equilibrium.
(d) The bank offers r(a1~Rh) if R z Rh, and rations if R z R1.
This is not a Nash equilibrium if
(1-61P(al)(E(al)-r(a1~Rh)] - V(al) ~ (i-6lp(a2)[X(a2)-r(a1~Rh)] - Y(aZ).
In addition, the LHS of this inequality should be positive for a Nash
equilibrium; otherwise, the borrower would be bettec off under sutarky. By
(A3), however, the LHS is negative. Hence, the contract offered by the
bank cannot be a Nash equilibrium.
(e) Mixed Aetion Contracts: Any credit contract that involves r(ai~Ri)
if g: R! and c(ajlRh) if R~~, with i c[1. 2}, jc[1. 2)
and isj, ean clearly never be a Nash equilibrium.
This exhausts the list of possible candidates for Nash equilibris and completes
the proof. Q.B.D.
The reason why the efficient action (a z al) is unattainable is that the
competitive spot borrowing rate for the borrower in the high interest rate state
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(and possibly also the low interest rate state) is so high that the borrower's net
payoff (the project return less the repayment obligation) is too low to induce a
choice of a ~ al. The borrower thus chooses a~ a2. The key observation here
is that an increase in the loan interest rate reduces the marginal return to effort
for the borrower, an incentive effect that manifests itself in the borrower lowering
effort supply.12 This distortionary incentive effect of the spot intecest rate
creates a natural economic incentive for a(fixed rate) loan commitment. This is
analyzed next.
4. LOAN COt44ITMENTS AND PARETO EFFICIENCY
In this section we wish to establish that a loan commitment13 can eliminate
the second best distortions inherent in spot lending. The idea is that Loan
commitments can reduce the dampening effect that interest rates have on the supply
of productive inputs such as effort. Our intuition is as follows. With a(fixed
rate) loan commitment, the bank can set the loan interest rate so low that the
borrower's action choice problem mirrocs its choice problem with self-financing.
This will result in the borrower choosing a first best action even in a Nash
equilibrium with ex post informational deficiencies. The Dorrowing rate under the
loan commitment in this case will generally be so low that the bank will suffer a
loss on the loan itself. To recover this loss, the banks can charge a commitment
fee upfront.14 The key is that the commitment fee is paid initially and thus
becomes a state-independent "sunk cost" for the borrowers with no impact on the
action choice. The analysis below will show that this arrangement not only Pareto
dominates spot contracts. but even provides a first best resolution of moral
hazard. Throughout this analysis we assume that the loan commitment contract aust
be honored by the bank and continue to assume that there are no taxes. We argue
12
later on that introducing taxes will only increase the attractiveness of a loan
commitment.
Our analysis in this section proceeds in two parts. Initially, we analyze loan
commitments with ihe assumption that the borrower puts up no equity of its own and
borrows from the Dank the entire amount of financing needed for the project. That
is, any liquidity the borrower has available at the outset is invested in the
commitment fee. (The borrower's initial liquidity is assumed limited. so that the
commitment fee completely exhausts it). We then allow the borcower the choice of
replacing the loan commitment with a spot loan combined with an equity input. That
is, instead of investing its initial liquidity in the commitment fee, the borrower
can use it as its equity input to the project and hence reduce its bank borrowing by
that amount. We provide an explicit comparison of these two alternatives and prove
formally that loan commitments always Pareto dominate.
A. Loan Commitments with no Borrower EavitY:
The forward credit market -- involving loan commitments -- in our model works as
follows. At t- 0 the borrower approaches a bank for a fixed rate loan commitment
that Suarantees funds availability at t~ 1. The loan commitment contract consiste
of a commitment fee g that must be paid at t- 0 and a precommitted loan interest
rate d(one plus the losn interest rate) ~ 0 that applies to the borrower's
(risky) loan taken at t. 1. The loan interest is choaen to be low enou;h to
guarantee that the borrower chooses a first best action. We assume that such a d
is less than 8:, so that the loan eommitment is always exercised.
PSOPOSITION 2: There exists a loan commitment contract that induces the borrower to
choose the first best action. Koceover, the (forward credit market) equilibrium
resulting from this contract offer strictly Pareto dominates any spot credit market
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equilibrium and produces a first best level of expected utility for the borrower.
PROOF: 1ie first establish that the loan commitment contract is incentive
compatible. Note that incentive compatibility requires that
p(al)[Z(al)-é] - V(al) ~ P(a2)[I(a2)-d] - V(a2).
Rearranging this inequality gives us
p(al)E(al) - P(a2)X(a2) - V(al) t V(a2) ~ d[P(al)-P(a2)l.
Given (A1). the incentive compatibility condition (6) clearly holds for all d
sufficiently small.ls Having determined a loan commitment interest rate d
c(O,r(allR~)) such that ( 6) holds, the bank will choose a commitment
fee g as follows





where Rf (one plus the current riskless rate) represents the bank's discount
rate. The commitment fee g is determined such that it exactly compensates the bank
for the loss it suffers on the loan taken down under the Loan commitment. Note that
p(al)[Ar(allRq) t[1-9)r(a11Rh)1 is the total expected interest
receipt based on the spot market interest rate, while p(al)d is the expeeted
receipt under the loan commitment. The commitment fee compensates the bank for the
difference between these two. Discounting is necessary because the commitment fee
is paid up front (t ~ 0), while the interest payments acerue to the bank at the end
of the second period. 41e now determine the borrower's expected utility under the
loan commitment. This expected utility is
p(al)IE(al)-d1 - V(al) - Rfg. (8)
Combining (7) and (8) and then rearranging gives us
eY(al)lx(al)-r(allRq] t [1-61P(al)[X(al)-r(a11Rh)] - V(al). (9)
The borrower's expected utility as stated in (9) is exactly equal to the borrower's
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expected utility in the full inforniation solution in Section 2. Hence, we have
established that the introduction of a loan commitment leads to the first best
equilibrium. Clearly, this equilibrium strictly Pareto dominates a~ spot credit
market equilibrium since all spot equilibria that exist involve welfare losses.
Q.E.D.
Perhaps the most important insight that emerbes from this pcoposition is that a
fixed rate loan commitment can be useful even though its direct value to the
borrower as an insurance policy against stochastic shifts in future interest rates
is zero. In our model, the borrower is risk neutcal and hence does not care about
being insured against a random borrowing rate. The value of a loan commitment lies
in its ability to (at least partially) decouple a bank's expected pcofit on the loan
to the borrower from the loan interest rate, thereby eliminating interest rate -
related distortions.
8 Loans Combined with Eauitv Yersus Loan Commitments with no EguitY:
The loan commitment contract we have analyzed involves the payment of an initial
commitment fee. Moreover, we have assumed that the bank fully finances the required
project investment, which equals ;1. One may argue. however, that allowing the
borrower to have sufficient initial liquidity to pay the commitment fee means that
the borrower could, as an alternative to the loan commitment, avail of spot
borrowing in conjunction with an equity input equal to its initial liquidity. This
would reduce the amount it would have to borrow and hence provide an alternative
mechanism for copins with moral hazard.1ó In this subsection we eompare the loan
co~nitment outcome with the bank loan cvm borrower equity outcome.
Define Qc(0,1) as the proportion of the investment that the borrower
self-finances. Given the il required investment, Q can also be defined as the
dollar-amount of equity invested in ihe project by the borrower. 2he remaininb
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investment, :(1-~), is financed by a spot bank loan. To resolve the moral haxard
problem in this case, one should choose Q such that the following condition is met




èla ~Q[p(a2)X(a2)-6Rq-(1-6)Rfi V(a2)) t (10)
ll-Q]{6p(a2)IX(a2)-r(a11R:)]fIl-9)p(a2)(X(a2)-r(a1~Rh))-V(a2)) ~
Q{OP(a2)X(a2)-9RQ-V(a )) t (1-Q]IeP(a2)fX(a2)-r(a1~RQ)]-V(a2))
The RHS of the inequality (10) allows for the possibility that, with the lower
action choice a2, it might be optimal for the borrower not to undertake the
investment if the spot riakless rate turns out to be Rh. As a matter of fact, the
assumptions in Section 2 imply that, given action a2, the investment will not be
undertaken in the Rh state. To see this, note that (use (1) and (A2-(i))),
p(a2)X(a2)-9R~-(1-9]Rh-V(a2) ~ 8p(a2)X(a2)-AR4-V(a2)














Q ~ V(al)-V(a2)-P(al)(X(al)-er(a11Rq)-ll-e]r(allRh))tP(a2)eIX(a2)-r(a1~E!)] (13) ~
Ar(a11R!)lP(al)-P(aZ)]
Define the RHS of (13) as H. Note that the feasibility restriction on S2 requires
that it should be positive. Combining this restriction with (13) yields
Q ~ 14ax(O,H).
The RHS of (13) specifies the minimum level of self-financing (or the minimum
proportion of the equity input) necessary and sufficient to overcome the moral
hazard problem. Note that the denominatoc of the RHS of (13) is obviously
positive. Horeover, the numerator is also strictly positive. This latter





The LHS of (A4)' is identical to the numerator of the RHS of (13). Hence, we have
shown that S2 is strictly positive. This implies that given (13), we can dispense
with (14).
The correspondence between (13) and (A4) should not be surprising. A violation
of (A4) would mean that there ie no moral hazard even with complete bank financing.
Consequently, the minimum level of self-financing required to resolve moral hazard
is zero, a condition that also follows directly from (13).
With these preliminaries, we can now establish that a loan commitment is the
dominant alternative. The main idea in our analysis is as follows. IE the funds
necessary for the commitment fee are less than the funds needed for the equity input
for the proportional self-financing of the project -- such that in both cases moral
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hazard is resolved -- then the loan commitment contract with full bank-loan
financing Pareto dominates the partial self-financing. spot loan option. So, we
want to show that
~ ~ gRf, (15)
where the star denotes an optimal value. Diote that we multiply the commitment fee ~
by an interest factor because the commitment fee is paid at tz0, while the
self-financing S?a takes place at t-1. Recall from (7) that g is defined as a
function of d. The optimal value for d is the one that satisfies (6). That is,




We can now derive the centcal result of our paper.
(17)
PROPOSITION 3: The loan commitment contract strictly Pareto dominates a spot loan
with borrower equity.
PROOF: We need to show that (15) holds, with g and d given by (16) and (17)
respectively. Note first that Stk is obtained with an equality in (13). Now
combining (16) and (17) gives us
gRf - P(aI)((P(al)-P(a2)IC-i}(Rf[P(al)-P(a2)l}-1.
where C - 9r(alla!) t ( I-A]r(aIIBh)
T - P(al)E(aI) - P(a2)I(a2) - V(aI)fV(a2).
Next, we note that since r(ailRj) s Bjlp(ai) for i a(1,2},
jc(9.,h}, and Rf s 6R: t[1-6]Rh, we have
(18)
Rflp(ai) L 6r(aIIR!) t (1-9]r(allRh). (19)
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Substituting for Rf~p(al) from (19) into (16) yields
BRf ~ [[P(al)-P(a2)]C - T}[[P(al)-P(a2)]C}-1.
Recall now that from (13)
í?x - V(al)-V(a2)-P(al)[X(al)-C)fp(a2)6[X(a2)-r(a11R!)]
Ar(alli~)IP(al)-P(a2)]
From (20) and (13') it is clear that (15) holds if
(V(al)-V(a2)-P(al)[X(al)-C]tp(a2)8(X(a2)-r(a11R4))}(9r(a11R~)}-1
([P(al)-P(a2)lC - T)C-1.





Ar(a1~R!)lP(al)C - p(a2)C - 7). (22)
Cancelling common terms on both sides of (22) and defining
Q - V(al)-V(a2)-P(al)[X(al)-C]tp(a?)e[X(a2)-r(alIR4)].
we obtain the following inequality that must hold
6r(a1~R!)P(a2)AX(a2)t(1-8]r(allRh)Q ~ -911-9]Y1 t 6Y2,
where Y1 - r(al[Rq)p(a2)r(al[Rh)
Y2 - r(a1~R!)p(a2)X(a2).
Row note that using either (A4) or (A4'), we can assert that Q ~ 0. Hence, a
sufficient condition for (23) to hold is
8r(allR!)P(a2)AX(a2) i -e[1-9]Y1 t 972,
which implies that we would like
-611-8]r(al[R!)p(a2)X(a2) ~ - e[1-6Jr(a1~R!)p(a2)r(a11Rh)





This completes the proof because (A2) implies that (24) holds. Q.E.D.
This is a atriking result. The standard approach to reducing the distortions
ereated by debt-celated moral hazard is to require the firm to inject more equity.
In the limit, of course, complete self-financing (all inside equity) eliminates
moral hazard. However, insufficient initial liquiditylwealth will force the firm~to
seek some outside financing. As mentioned earlier, in our model this outside
financing optimally takes the form of debt. Conventional wisdom says that, in order
to minimize distortions, the borrower should fully exhaust its liquidity first as an
equity input and then seek outside debt financing only for the remainder. This
argument assumes that the borrower operates solely in the spot market. We have
shown that, when forward credit markets are accessible, borrowers should purchase
loan commitments under which they can assure themselves of future borrowing
privileges at predetermined rates. This use of initial Liquidity strictly dominates
the alternative of usíng it as equity in conjunction with a spot loan.
The intuition behind this finding is as follows. Because a fixed rate loan
commitment pegs the loan interest rate at the same level regacdless of the spot
rate, it reduces the customer's borrowing rate by different vercentaRes in the low
and high interest rate states. In particular, it provides a greater percentage
reduction in the high interest rate state. And this is the state in which interest
rate-related distortions are the most severe. On the other hand, partial equity
financing reduces distortions evenly across both the low and the high interest rate
states. This is cleacly less efficient.ll
Although we have focused on fixed rate loan commitments, our analyais is
applicable also to fixed forrtula or variable rate loan commitments. Campbell(1978)
and Thakor, Hong and Greenbaum(1981) explain that such commitments involve some
fixity in the borrowing rate evert though this rate is a function of the prime rate.
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For example, "prime plus" variable rate commitments fix the add-on over the prime
rate that the borrower must pay. In the context of our model, we would end up with
different ó's for the low and the high interest rate states, but these could
obviously be designed to provide the greatest percentage reduction in the loan rate
in the high interest cate state. We would consequently have the same intuition
driving the superiocity of loan commitments over spot borrowing with equity.
Finally, a word on taxes. Since the loan commitment fee is tax deductible for
the borrower but its equity input is not, the introduction of taxes will further
enhance the appeal of commitments in our mndel.
S. CONCLUSION
We have provided an economic rationale for bank loan commitments in a
competitive credit market characterized by universal risk neutrality. Central to
our model is an ex post informational asymmetcy Detween the bank and the borrower
with respect to the action chosen by the borrower. If the borrower could
self-finance, it would choose the first best action. But when the borrower Einances
the project with a bank loan in the spot ccedit market, a second best action choice
is made. Borrower incentives for reducing effort supply stem from the distortionary
effect of loan interest rates that are driven to suboptimally high Levels due to
random fluctuations in the spot riskless rate.18 A loan commitment is shown to be
capable of eliminating this welfare distortion. With a loan commitment, the bank
can set the borrowing rate arbitcarily low such that no distortionary effects are
present. This arbitrarily low borrowing rate causes losses to the bank, but the
bank is compensated by a cammitment fee paid at the initial point in time. Since
the commitment Eee itself has no incentive effact, the loan commitment contract
essentially gives the bank an additionai degree of flexibility -- relative to a spot
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credit contract -- in contract design and enables it to circumvent the welfare
losses related to its inability to observe the borrower's action choice ex post.
While it may also sometimes be possible to eliminate these welfare losses with spot
credit contracts involving a sufficiently large borrower equity input, we have
explicitly shown that the loan commitment contract strictly Pareto dominates such
spot market resolutions.19 Moreover, the introduction of taxes gives loan
commitments an advantage relative to spot borrowing with equity.
A caveat to our analysis deserves note. Our finding that a loan commitment
produces the first best outcome is not a general one. 8ather, it depends on our
assumption that the borrower's action choice is limited to three actions (includiiig
the choice of doing nothing). If the borrower's feasible action space was
nondenumerable, then we would find that a loan commitment will not generally restore
first best. It will, however, still strictly Pareto dominate spot contracts.
The principal contribution of this paper is that it explains the existence of
loan commitments under universal risk neutrality, and in the absence of transaction
costs. We thus have an explanation for loan commitment demand by corporations owned
by diversified shareholders. More fundamentally, our research suggests a new way of
looking at the optimality of forward contracts and options in general, namely in
terms of their possibly superior incentive effects relative to spot contracts, based
purely on the grounds of greater contract design flexibility. From a somewhat
narrower perspective. our research points out that discussions of fixed rate loan
commitments as simple insurance policies are misguided. The insurance view is not
only incapable of explaining why public corporations seek fixed rate loan
commitments but it also results in a compelling focus on an aspect of loan
commitments that we have formally shown is quite inessential to their
(welfare-enhancing) existence.
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A secondary contribution of this paper is the implication it has for the credit
rationing literat~re. The papers of Stiglitz and Weiss(1981, 1983) have shown that
banks may prefer to ration credit rather than adjust loan interest rates upward
Decause of the adverse sorting cum incentive effects of such a strategy. What our
research indicates is that forward contracting, through its ability to lessen
interest rate - related distortions, could obviate the need to ration credit.20
Fínally, our analysis also sheds new light on the capital structure issue. The
agency costs of debt (Jensen and Meckling (1976)) have been identified as a
distortion that partly offsets the tax advantage of debt and leads to lower debt
usage than predicted by Modigliani and Killer (1963). Our model suggests that a way
to reduce debt-related costs without dissipating the associated tax shield is to
utilize loan commitments. In fact, a loan commitment is a more powerful way of
reducing moral hazacd than even partial self-financing with inside equity.
A fruitful future extension of ouc analysis would be to endogenize the existence
of the bank -- perhaps along the lines of Ramakrishman and Thakor(1984) or Millon
and Thakor(1985) -- and also explicitly permit the bank the option to dishonor the
commitment. Reputation and related effects may then be useEul in explaining why
commitments are usually honored. Work along these lines is currently underway.
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FOOTt10TES
1. In an interesting paper that models both sides of the loan commitment market.
Campbell(1978) uses a general utility function for the borrower. In his model,
though, a demand for loan commitments can only arise if borrowers are risk
averse. James(1981) assumes both borrowers and banks are risk neutcal. but does
not formally justify why commitments exist. Rather, his objective is to explain
a borrower's choice between a commitment fee and a compensating balance. For
another paper on the subject, see Berkovitch and Greenbaum(1986). In that paper
too, loan commitments are rationalized in a risk neutral world with asymmetric
information. The model has borrowers taking first period loans to finance
projects that require incremental second period financing. The amount of second
period financing required is unknown at the outset but is revealed (only) to the
borrower at the start of the second period. Now, the bocrower has no incentive
to invest in the project in the second period when its total (first and second
period) repayment obligation exceeds its maximum vossible terminal payoff. But
the bank does want investment to be continued in these states. Thus, there is
an ex post inefficiency. It is shown that a loan commitment can restore
incentive compatibility thcough a"split" pricing structure that accommodates a
Lower second peciod repayment obligation for the borrower.
2. Although Thakor and Udell(1987) rationalize the existence of loan commitments in
their framework, their main objective is not to explain why loan coimnitments
exist, but to explain the informational role of specific characteristics of loan
commitment eontracts.
3. GLrrently, outstanding loan commitments at U.S. commercial benks amount to
billions of dollars, and bank participation in this activity is rapidly growing
(see Greenbaum, Soss and Thakor(1985)).
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4. A more serious problem with assuming transactions costs in a model of a
competitive equilibrium under asymmetric information is that they introduce
"fixed cost" elements and hence increasing returns to scale in the supply
functions of banks. This interferes with establishing the existence of a
competitive (non-cooperative) equilibrium (see, for example, Wilson(1977)).
S. Greenbaum, Kanatas and Vennezia(1986), in research done independently of ours,
provide the insight that asymmetric information is central in rationalizing loan
commitments in a risk neutral milieu. In their model, loan commitments have the
added advantage of allowing the bank to plan ahead and thus acquire funds at a
Lower cost than it could in the (future) spot market. In our model, loan
commitments provide no such service. Another important distinction is that a
loan commitment in Greenbaum, Kanatas and Vennezia improves the bank's
information extraction capability -- in a revelation principle context --
whereas it reduces distortionary effort supply incentives in our model. Thus,
the two papers highlight two distinct functions of loan commitments under
imperfect inEormation. Another paper that explains why risk neutral borrowers
may purchase loan conunitments is Kanatas(1987). However, Kanatas predicts that
loan commitments are purchased explicitly to back up commercial paper, whereas
our paper predicts a more general use of commitments.
6. See also Stiglitz and Weiss(1983).
7. Thus, we ignore other -- potentially impoctant -- credit instruments like
collateral (see Besanko and Thakor(1987b) for an analysis of the incentive
effects of collateral).
8. See, for example, Stiglitz and Weiss(1984).
9. Basically. one would require that none of the ex post return is observable to
the bank -- the borrower can expropriate it for its own consumption without
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effective bank verification -- so that an equity contract is infeasible. But
since the bank can observe whether the project succeeded or not, it can impose a
sufCicíently large penalty on the borrower in case there is default following
project success. If this penalty is large enough, the borrower will indeed
repay the loan, conditional on project success. Such a penalty will be
infeasible when the project is unsuccessful because the borrower has no funds
with which to pay the penalty.
10. We might rewrite (4) as
6p(a2)IX(a2)-r(alIRQ))-V(a2) ~ 6p(al)lE(al)-r(allRi))-V(al)
-I6p(al)-eP(a2))Ir(a2IRq)-r(allRi)). (4')
It is easy to see that this is less restrictive than (A4).




To show that ( S) is less restrictive than (A4) it is sufficient to show that




12. For a similac observation, see Chan and Thakor(1987). An increase in the Loan
interest rate has other distortionary sffects as well, particulacly those
related to investment choice. See, for instance, Stiglitz and Weiss(1981, 1983).
13. A fixed rate loan commitment contcact is defined as a promise by the bank to
lend up to a certain amount at or during prespecified time at a fixed rate of
interest. Essentially, the bank sells the customer a put option that
26
contcactually ties the bank to make a future loan but gives the customer the
option of taking or not taking it (see Thakor(1982) and Thakor, èiong and
Greenbaum(1961)).
14. Because it is not that important here. we suppress the question of where the
borrower obtains the funds for paying the commitment fee. Little generality is
Lost by assuming that the borrower's initial (t - 0) wealth endowment
accommodates the co~nitment fee but is insufficient to permit self-financing.
We do, however, analyze in this section the borrower's choice between the loan
commitment and ap rtly self-financing a spot loan.
15. In principle, there is nothing in our model to disallow negative loan interest
rates, i.e., d can be less than 1. This is because the loan commitment is an
o-ption, and we have assumed that the bank's precommitment to honor the terms of
this option contract is bindinR. That is, the borrower may decide not to
exercise the commitment option but the bank mist lend if the borrower
exercises. (In the next section we consider the bank's incentive to not honor
the commitment). In this case, the bank does not care about the loan interest
rate as long as the commitment fee is large enough to ensure at least zero
expected profit.
If institutional considerations disallow d ~ 1, then we must assume that,
under self-financing, the Dorrower surplus resulting from a choice of al as
opposed to a ehoice of a2 is large enough (this i s simply a plausible
restriction on exogenous parameter values) to ensure that (6) holds even with
d i 1.
16. We thank Michael Brennan for suggesting to us that this possibility should be
examined.
17. We would Like to thank Elazar Berkovitch for suggesting to us that there is
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another possible factor which reinforces the reason why loan commitments
dominate equity. When a customer purchases a loan commitment by paying a
commitment fee. it makes an irrevocable investment since the cor~anittnent fee is
kept by the bank even if the cotranitment option is not exercised by the
customer. i~Jith equity, however, the customer has the choice of not investing
after it observes the spot borrowing rate. Thus, there ie a stronger
precotmnitment by the customer with a loan conanitment than with equity. This
strengthens its incentives to choose the first best action with a loan
commitment.
1Jhile this intuition is correct, what is interesting is that it is
unneccessary for our result; the dominance of a loan commitment can be sustained
even if the above effect is absent. In our model, the customer always wants to
borrow in the spot market if it does not purchase a Loan cosmnitment, and a loan
commitment dominates even if one assumes that the spot market equilibrium
entails no rationing. That is, in our vroof we did not make use of the
"flexibilitv" of eauitr relative to loan corRnitments.
18. The distortionary effect of loan interest rates is not in itself caused by the
randomness in the spot rate, but only exaggerated by it. However, randomness in
the spot rate is essential to establish the dominance of a loan cosmnitment over
equity.
19. Our analysis of the spot market outcosne in Section 3 does not allow the borrower
an equity input, whereas in Section 4A we Let the borrower have sufficient
initial liquidity to pay the commitment fee. In light of our analysis in
Section 48, we see that the effect of introducing equity in Section 3 would only
be to cos~licate the algebraic comparisons without changing the results or the
intuition.
20. For research that takes up this issue rigorously, see Boot(1987).
2~
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